A Philosophy of Physical Education Oriented toward the Game as an Object. Showing the Inexhaustible Reality of Games through Bernard Suits' Theory. by García Puchades, Wenceslao
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rsep20
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy
ISSN: 1751-1321 (Print) 1751-133X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsep20
A Philosophy of Physical Education Oriented
toward the Game as an Object. Showing the
Inexhaustible Reality of Games through Bernard
Suits’ Theory
Wenceslao Garcia-Puchades & Oscar Chiva-Bartoll
To cite this article: Wenceslao Garcia-Puchades & Oscar Chiva-Bartoll (2020) A Philosophy of
Physical Education Oriented toward the Game as an Object. Showing the Inexhaustible Reality
of Games through Bernard Suits’ Theory, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 14:2, 192-205, DOI:
10.1080/17511321.2019.1630476
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2019.1630476
Published online: 11 Jun 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 54
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
A Philosophy of Physical Education Oriented toward the
Game as an Object. Showing the Inexhaustible Reality of
Games through Bernard Suits’ Theory
Wenceslao Garcia-Puchades a and Oscar Chiva-Bartoll b
aFacultat de Magisteri, Didactica Expresión Musical, Plastica y Corporal, Universitat de Valencia, Valencia,
Spain; bDepartamento de Educación y Didácticas Específicas, Universitat Jaume I, Castello de la Plana,
Spain
ABSTRACT
Although a large number of theories justify the presence of games in
school, all of them converge in two of the educational functions
described by Biesta, socialization and qualification. In contrast to this
instrumental educational approach, the present article aims to develop
the bases for a philosophy of physical education (PE) oriented toward
the game as an object. This proposal is supported by Suits’ theory of
games and the object-oriented philosophy (OOP) introduced by
Harman. The text presents a justification for games in the school
setting by defending its intrinsic value. First, the instrumentalist justi-
fications for games are presented in order to establish the state of the
art. Second, an explanation is provided about the degree to which the
object-oriented philosophy can complement these justifications. Third,
the article explains why Suits’ theory of games establishes the con-
ceptual bases for developing what we could call a philosophy of PE
oriented toward the game as an object. Finally, an example is provided






Much has been said about Bernard Suits’ theory of games from the field of sport
philosophy, but little from the philosophy of physical education (PE) (García-Puchades
and Chiva-Bartoll 2018). However, as this article will show, Suits’ response to the
problems arising from the definition of play, game and sport (Suits 1978, 1984, 2012,
2013) allows us to reflect anew on the philosophy of PE, providing further arguments for
the pedagogical potential of the game (Kretchmar 1997, 2008; Loland 2002).
When observing the tradition of the philosophy of PE from the educational perspec-
tive proposed by Biesta (2010), it could be said that its theories have tried to justify the
presence of games in schools based mainly on their socialization and qualification
functions. Regarding its socialization justifications, games are instruments for social
integration, whereas from the qualification perspective, they are means to develop the
human being’s essential capabilities in order to live a worthwhile life. However, we can
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also affirm that these justifications have left aside the capacity for subjectification of
games (Biesta 2010, 20). From the perspective of subjectification, games should be
understood not only as instruments capable of developing skills or abilities, but also
capable of favouring situations in which the individual is impelled to be responsible for
his/her own actions, as a consequence of the interruption of conventional knowledge
(Garcia-Puchades and Chiva-Bartoll 2018).
The following text aims to open up new fields of application of Bernard Suits’ theory
of games. Our intention is not to enter into discussions about his ideas but to argue to
what extent Suits’ theory of games, when contemplated from the point of view of the
Object-Oriented Philosophy (OOP) developed by Harman (2018), allows us to draw a first
approximation of what could be called a philosophy of PE oriented toward the game as
an object. OOP not only presupposes the existence of objects-in-themselves, but it also
considers that this presupposition implies that there is no definitive or exhaustive
characterization of them. As we will try to argue in this text, this philosophy could
help us to establish the theoretical basis for developing a justification of games in the
school setting based on its capacity for subjectification that complements the discourses
of socialization and qualification.
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, we describe the dominant justifications of
games following Biesta’s education theory. Secondly, we explain how OOP could com-
plement these justifications. Thirdly, we explain how Suits’ theory of games establishes
the conceptual basis for developing a philosophy of PE oriented toward the game as an
object. Finally, an example of how this philosophy can guide the practice of PE is given.
The Instrumentalist Justification for Games in the Philosophy of PE
The concept of games has had a long history within the western educational philosophical
discourse. If we focus on the dominant liberal paradigm of the 20th century, education had
to do basically with the development of rationality. For this reason, since games were not
considered relevant to the improvement of rationality, they were relegated to a secondary
position in the curriculum (Conant 1963; Hirst 1974; Hirst and Peters 1970; Lawson 1984;
Peters 1966). However, many philosophers of PE have tried to justify games within
educational institutions. The result has been a variety of theories that have tended to
defend themultifaceted, paradoxical, and elusive nature of games. In someway, reflection
on the role of games has been addressed by different traditions and practical orientations
within the philosophy of PE (Stolz 2014, 17–24). In our opinion, it is possible to classify
these discourses based on two of the functions that dominate contemporary educational
practice: socialization and qualification (Biesta 2010, 19–22).
Socialization is one of the fundamental functions of education, and it has to do with the
many ways education allows citizens ‘to become part of a particular social, cultural, or
political order’ (Biesta 2010, 20). This function is found in many educational justifications for
games. According to Devís (2008, 80–81), games as socializing elements have gained
strength as an educational practice directed toward character formation in the last two
centuries. On the question of how games and sports are connected to social values, there
are two possible understandings: internalism, which claims that games and sports have their
own intrinsic values, and externalism, which considers that values in sports reflect those of
society (Simon 2007, 2015). Although Simon’s internalism considers sport as a place in which
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humans can flourish, which ties the practice of sport to virtues and values in the larger
society, the role of socialization of games lies mainly in the values attributed to games in the
social context (Russell 2007). Not in vain, Ashworth (1971) and McIntosh (1979) had already
mentioned the ideal of justice of games (and of sports) as one of the social values of the
moment, proposing that it ismerely a symbolic reflection of social life. In this vein, McNamee
(2008), influenced by the Aristotelian ethic, understands the values of games as a collection
of virtues that transcend the practice itself and are able to guide other social situations.
The function of qualification lies in the way education provides children and young
people ‘with knowledge, skills and understandings and often also with the dispositions
and forms of judgment “to do something”’ (Biesta 2010, 19). For Devís (2008), some
objectives strongly emerge in this function, such as children’s correct physical develop-
ment, learning about hygiene based on the acquisition of healthy habits, and the
compensatory function of physical activity. As an example, some studies have found
evidence of cognitive, physical, moral, and emotional development in early childhood
learning through games (Broadhead and Burt 2012). Another type of qualifying justifica-
tion for games in the curriculum can be found in theories that defend their contribution
to the students’ aesthetic education (Da Costa and Oliveira 2016; Hein 1968), practical
rationality in movement (Anderson 2002; Arnold 1979; Connolly 2008; Stolz 2013), and
recreation (Dumazedier 1974).
In summary, the qualifying justifications share a similar substrate with the socializers,
that is, the conception of games as instruments. For both types of discourse, games
would be considered as a useful means to achieve a set of measurable learning out-
comes. This set of outcomes is related to a priori knowledge that allows us to evaluate
the educational value of games according to their impact. This allows us to make
a planned use of games depending on our curricular needs (Biesta 2010). Below, we
present a non-instrumental justification for games in the curriculum. The educational
value of this justification is based not on the knowledge of a set of learning outcomes,
but on the exploration of the different possibilities when playing a game.
A Justification Oriented toward the Game as an Object
For Biesta (2018, 14), education should not merely be aimed at producing ‘a narrow set of
outcomes’, but it must ‘provide opportunities for children and young people to express
themselves, that is, to appear as individuals “in the world” and “with the world”. In other
words, education should not simply contribute to qualification and socialization, “but also
impact on what we might refer to as individuation or, as I [Biesta] prefer to call it,
subjectification, the process of becoming a subject” (Biesta (2010, 20). Taking Levinas’
existentialism as a reference, Biesta (2013, 21) affirms that subjectivity ‘emerges’ in certain
situations as a consequence of the encounter with ‘the Other’, which is a ‘domain’ that lies
beyond conventional knowledge. Only on these occasions ‘I cannot be replaced or sub-
stituted by someone else’, therefore I am completely ‘responsible’ for my action. According
to Biesta (2013, 105), we should view the subjectification of an individual experience as ‘a
new beginning’, as an act of radical creativity in and with the world. In the absence of
knowledge to turn to, individuals can only turn to themselves to seek new possibilities for
action, to relate to the world around them and find new meanings.
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Subjectivity cannot be planned, since it is not something that we have or know. In
this sense, Biesta’s subjectification resembles the concept of creation theorized by
Collingwood (1938) in his theory of art. For this author, creators do not produce some-
thing technically because they have not been acting in order to achieve any further end
or following a preconceived plan (Collingwood 1938, 128–9). In this vein, Biesta (2010)
affirms that the function of subjectification, unlike socialization and qualification, is not an
instrumental one, since it is not linked to any a priori knowledge that allows us to plan
its educational use in order to achieve desirable and measurable outcomes. Subjectivity
‘is something that can be realized, from time to time, in always new, open, and
unpredictable situations of encounters’ (Biesta 2013, 12). In this sense, although teachers
cannot force or plan students’ subjectification, they can try to make it more likely to
happen (Biesta 2013, 22). Keeping education open to the ‘event of subjectivity’ requires
a pedagogy of interruption, that is, ‘a pedagogy that aims to keep the possibility of
interruptions of the normal order open’ (Biesta 2010, 90). To this end, the teacher could
use different communicative strategies to ‘shake’ their students’ beliefs and presupposi-
tions ‘in a deconstructive way’. This ‘communication in deconstruction’ supposes ‘an
affirmation of an otherness that is always to come’: a participative, open and generative
communicative process by which the teacher gets the students to ask and reflect on
certain theories, assumptions and expectations (Biesta 2013, 38, 41, 42).
In our opinion, the task of deconstructing our assumed knowledge underlies the OOP
developed by Harman (2002). However, as we will show in the next section, unlike
Biesta’s assertions, this task is always linked to objects (Harman 2011, 2018). OOP
proposes different operations to question our knowledge about objects in order to
present their particular otherness, or what Kant (1998) called its noumenal component,
that is, the object-in-itself. In this sense, approaching Harman’s OOP through Biesta’s
theory of education offers us the possibility of justifying the educational value of objects
in general, and games in particular, in a non-instrumental way. Hence, before develop-
ing what could be considered a justification of games in the school setting based on its
capacity for subjectification, we will briefly outline what OOP is and what operations it
proposes to present the objects’ internal otherness.
Object-Oriented Philosophy
OOP (also known as Object-Oriented Ontology) dates from the late 1990s, although it
becomes best known as one of the four currents emerging from the so-called Speculative
Realism in the late 2000s. Speculative Realism is a term that was coined at a conference held at
Goldsmiths College, University of London, in April 2007. It involved Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton
Grant, Graham Harman and Quentin Meillassoux (Brassier et al. 2007). All of them struggled
against a common enemy: correlationism. For correlationism, whose origin they locate in
Kantian philosophy, as human beings, we cannot grasp the world as it is ‘in itself’ (the
noumenal) in isolation from its relationship with the world as it is ‘for us’ (the phenomenal).
On the other hand, Speculative Realism insists that the world exists ‘in itself’ and we can
speculate about it (Gratton 2014). In this regard, Harman (2012, 17) considers that Kant’s
mistake is to ‘hold that the relation of appearance to the in-itself is an all-or-nothing affair’, that
is, since the things-in-themselves cannot be made present, we are restricted to discussions of
the conditions of human experience. Indeed, there are different artistic and literary operations
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that show us that the fact we are not able to directly present the things-in-themselves does
not forbid us from having indirect access to them (Harman 2012, 17; 2018, 58–101).
Graham Harman’s OOP, unlike the rest of the founders of Speculative Realism, recovers
the fascination with objects in a provocative way. Taking its foundations from
Heideggerian phenomenology combined with Bruno Latour’s ANT (Action Network
Theory), Zubiri’s metaphysics and Ortega’s aesthetics, OOP is sustained in a radical and
imaginative ontology that not only affirms that objects (whether they be human, non-
human, natural, cultural, real or fictional) exist beyond the purview of human conception,
but also that this existence is not directly accessible from the way we normally experience
them (Harman 2018, 9). The task of OOP is to account for this gap between the sensual and
the real dimension of an object, showing that the inexhaustible way in which an object is
normally presented to us does not exhaust the real object (Harman 2018).
In order to do it, we must bring to light four types of tensions that exist due to the
intersection of two axes (real/sensual and object/qualities): space, time, eidos, essence
(Harman 2011, 99–102). Showing its time, we verify that an object is less than its
accidental or sensual qualities, and its superfluous additions can be withdrawn without
the object itself being harmed (Harman 2011, 23, 100). With its eidos, we verify that an
object will never be completely presented through its real qualities, which are theore-
tical abstractions only accessible through the intellect, since we can always add a new
one (Harman 2011, 27–28). Presenting its space, we are aware of the immeasurable
system that relates its elements according to a specific function (Harman 2011, 38–39).
Finally, by showing its essence, we know that even though the object seems to need its
real qualities to exist, they are not the object itself. Every essence necessarily withdraws
both from other essences and from itself; therefore, it lies beyond any possible char-
acterization (Harman 2011, 104–105). These four types of tensions create a scheme of
sameness and difference inside an object that explains the infinite possibilities to inter-
pret it without exhausting it (Wolfendale 2014).
However, these tensions do not show anything about how genuine changes are
produced in an object. To explain these changes, it is necessary to understand how
these tensions are broken. In this regard, Harman (2011, 102–107) talks about four types
of fundamental operations: confrontation, theory, allure and causation. We encounter
confrontation as a rupture of the time of an object. Through confrontation we realise that
sometimes the sensual qualities deceive us, and what seemed to be one thing finally
turns out to be another (Harman 2011, 103). As a rupture of eidos, theory shows that the
real qualities that once characterized an object could change (Harman 2011, 104). Allure,
as a rupture in the space of an object, makes us aware that sometimes other functions,
and with them other relational systems, can appear beyond the ordinary ones (Harman
2011, 103). Causation, by breaking its essence, allows us to imagine what an object
would be like if we speculated about possible real qualities that have not been known
yet (Harman 2011, 105).
Finally, what these tensions and ruptures prove is that the different ways to interpret or
transform an object do not exhaust the object itself. This allows OOP to justify the difference
between the object itself and the object related to us. In doing so, this philosophy attributes
to the object a space of uncertainty that is worthy of being examined for its own sake, that is,
a thing of wonder (Bogost 2012, 129). As we have shown above, it allows us to think about
an educational use of OOP applied to games. In our opinion, these tensions and ruptures
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could be interpreted as deconstruction strategies that PE teachers could use to make their
students question the familiar way to play games. Furthermore, by inviting their students to
go beyond their conventional relationship with games, an interesting proposal could be to
bring Biesta’s idea of subjectification to PE practice. PE teachers could learn fromOOP how to
encourage students to explore the game rather than simply plucking the already ‘known’
answer from them or the text. In other words, OOP offers some ideas to use games not only
in terms of their impact on learning outcomes but also the idea of the game for the game’s
sake. Later we will try to apply these strategies to the learning process of games. For now,
we will try to justify to what extent it is possible to interpret Suits’ theory of games from
the OOP.
The Orientation toward the Object in Bernard Suits’ Theory of Games
Complementing the traditional philosophical tendencies of PE focused on intensifying
the relational dimension of games, the philosophy of PE oriented toward objects would
explore games as objects-in-themselves by highlighting their tensions and ruptures.
However, how could they be accessed if they are set apart from every ordinary relation-
ship? They could be accessed through game-playing, that is, through games as objects-
for-us.
In our opinion, Suits’ theory of games supports this idea. Below we will try to
argue to what extent Suits offers us the possibility of exploring the inscrutable reality
of games through his definition of ‘playing a game’ (or what we will call ‘a ludic
practice’) as an exploration of the infinite relational possibilities of its components
according to an intrinsic finality. When playing, the player is not only able to interpret
its elements, giving rise to different actions, but s/he is also capable of transforming
them, looking for new challenges. For Suits, playing a game does not use up the
game’s possibilities. An infinite number of ways can always be found to play a game
and we cannot say which is the real one. We will look at these arguments in greater
detail.
The Game as an Intentional Object: The Ludic Practice
Bernard Suits (1978) is a philosopher of reference in the reflection on the meaning of
games and, in spite of objections to his definition of playing, his works are an excellent
catalyzer of later philosophical debates (Hurka 2006; Kretchmar 2006; Mcbride 1979;
Meier 1988; Thompson 2004, to name some of them). One of the fundamental aspects of
Suits’ work is the idea that any comprehension of a game must be explored through
what it means to play a game.
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [prelusory goal], using only
means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in
favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just
because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]. (Suits 1978, 41)
In his definition, Suits shows the four conditions of game playing. Although each of the
four conditions is a necessary (but no sufficient) condition to be a case of game playing,
the four of them taken together (as a unified formula) are a sufficient condition for any
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instance of game playing (Kobiela 2016, 18; Suits 1978, 35). The prelusory goal indicates
the objective of a particular game. The only requirement of the prelusory goal is that it is
self-referential, so it does not make sense or have any relevance outside the game itself
(Huang and Ryall 2018, 83). The lusory means specify how the goal can be reached, and
they are inherently inefficient. They reveal a distinction from work, where the means
used must be efficient in order to reach the goal. The lusory means are regulated by rules
that specify how the game can be played. The constitutive rules prohibit the most
efficient way to reach the goal. This is directly analogous with Caillois (1961), for
whom ludus, unlike the anarchic and free game (paidia), introduces ‘taste for gratuitous
difficulty’. This idea is highlighted by Hurka (2006, 227), who nuances the original Suits’
definition of lusory attitude by stating that a player would accept the rules ‘not just
because they make the game possible, but also because they make it difficult’. Thus, for
Hurka (2006, 227), while the rules, the means, and the prelusory goal make the game
a valuable activity by introducing an intrinsic difficulty, the lusory attitude chooses it
because of this feature. Besides ‘if something is intrinsically good, the positive attitude of
loving it for the property that makes it good, that is, desiring, pursuing and taking
pleasure in that for that property, is also, and separately, intrinsically good’ (Hurka 2006,
227–8). Finally, to play a well-formed game, it is necessary to assure that the level of
difficulty at the time of achieving that goal pursued is motivating enough to attempt the
challenge, but also to accept that players could fail if they do not make an effort: ‘An
impossible game is not worth playing, while a goal that is too easy becomes boring’
(Huang and Ryall 2018, 90).
Therefore, we see how the lusory attitude converts the relationship with the game
into a special situation. Salen and Zimmerman (2003, 96) relate to this special situation
using the term the magic circle. In its interior, ‘a new reality is created, defined by the
rules of the game and inhabited by its players’. The result would be a space unified by
the player’s intention to find it valuable to explore the possible means for resolving the
challenge. However, for Suits, there are other types of games, such as make-believe
games, that make us question the closed nature of this intentional space. In this type of
game, situations arise where the players can adapt its different elements in order to
keep the game alive. Thus, Suits (1978, 133) adapts his definition of game-playing in
order to include these open-ended practices.
The Open-Ended Ludic Practice
According to Suits (1978, 133) an open-ended ludic practice has the challenge of prolonging
the game for as long as possible. In order to achieve this, players must adopt an attitude
aimed at maximizing their ‘role-performances” (1978, 112, 125, 135). According to this
attitude, a player’s performance would be successful if it evokes new responses (1978, 125).
Thus, with the intention of keeping the game alive and evoking more responses, the players
can accept the end, the means, and the rules with greater flexibility. This attitude differs from
the goal-oriented attitude adopted by the players in closed ludic practices. In the latter, the
players define a challenge as a state of affairs to achieve and some rules to follow, and so it is
clear when the game ends. Onemight think thatmore rule-based gameswould be associated
with closed practices, and less rule-based games withmore open practices. However, for Suits
(1978, 136), both types of games are more or less open practices.
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From our point of view, the open-ended attitude would indicate the degree of flexibility
a player accepts when playing and, therefore, the degree of uncertainty she is willing to
accept. Uncertainty is fundamental in the progression of a game, and it is experienced in the
interior of the intentional space of the game as a conflict with its components. The multiple
situations that can arise in a game are unpredictable. Malaby (2007) relates this unpredict-
ability of games to their capacity to generatemeanings and, therefore, to the interpretability of
their elements. ‘Interpretability’ is what keeps the game going, the desire to discover what is
going to happen (Bateman 2011, 48). The open-ended nature of the ludic practice forces the
player to interpret its components according to the uncertainty s/he is willing to accept
regarding: the prelusory goal, defining the challenge as a state of affairs to achieve or
maximizing ‘role-performance’; the constitutive rules, adopting a flexible attitude in pursuit
of a longer or shorter game; the lusory means, accepting a way to resolve a challenge or
searching for different alternatives; the lusory attitude, valuing the necessary difficulty of
a challenge to maintain the motivation.
Players can discover numerous ways to solve a challenge, by interpreting its objec-
tives, rules, means, and difficulties in different ways, but they cannot say that any of
them is the genuine one. Therefore, in the same way that OOP brings to light the
intrinsic tensions of an object to show that the object is something more than what we
can say about it, the different ways in which one player overcomes a challenge by
interpreting its elements shows that a game is something more than the set of possible
solutions to this challenge. We will develop this idea in the following section.
Until now, we have talked about how changes occur in the game without transform-
ing any of its elements. Any type of change in a ludic practice occurs on the plane of the
players’ interpretation, due to the uncertainty of its components. However, the ludic
practice can change showing a substantial transformation in its components. For exam-
ple, as Suits states, it is possible to play a game even though the rules or the means can
be changed in order to ‘heighten the difficulties they [players] are required to overcome’
(Suits 1978, 38). The transformation of the challenge creates a conflict in the persistence
of the intentional space of a game to the degree that is presented as a radically different
experience. However, the essence of the game remains beyond this transformation. In
these situations, just as OOP highlights the intrinsic ruptures in the capacity of causation
of an object to show that its essence is something more than the set of different
possibilities of using it, the chance of choosing different challenges within a game
could be understood as its essence, that is, the inexhaustible source of transformation
of a ludic practice. In other words, a ludic practice does not exhaust the game, because
a player can always find a new challenge to overcome. Therefore, in the same way that
OOP affirms that a real object is a withdrawal from our way of experiencing it, we can
understand the game in Suits’ theory as that which is a withdrawal from our ludic
practice. Thus, whereas a ludic practice is one of the many ways of executing a game
(the intention to overcome a difficult enough challenge by accepting some rules and
according to some means), the game is what is always withdrawn from any execution,
since the player can always find new challenges that make this practice different. This
conception of the game would coincide with that of Malaby (2009), who states that the
game is merely a form of contrived contingency created with the intention of being
open to interpretation. Taking this idea as a reference, we could affirm that the game is
SPORT, ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY 199
a contingent or uncertain reality, and a ludic practice is the interpretation of this
contingency by the player through a lusory attitude.
However, the distance that separates the game from playing is permeable (Bogost
2012; Castronova 2005). This distance is what allows the player to explore new chal-
lenges and modify the rules, without varying the essence of the game. Therefore, the
game inspires the players’ natural curiosity and motivates them to explore countless
operations to overcome different challenges (Bogost 2012, 54). To that extent, just as
OOP does with objects, Suits’ theory of games allows us to attribute the property of
astonishing to the game.
Furthermore, the distinction between game and ludic practice offers the chance to
view the conflict between the static nature of the intrinsic properties and values of the
game and the dynamic nature of the reasons why an individual approaches it, without it
implying renouncing to the autotelic nature of the game (Schmid 2011, 156–157). The
lusory attitude of the player in considering the intrinsic properties of such activity as
valuable, does not exhaust all possibilities of experiencing a game. An individual can use
the game for other reasons than the merely intrinsic ones, that is, finding valuable the
prestige that derives from it, or the opportunity of meeting other individuals, ‘without
that [lusory] attitude somehow being destroyed or contaminated by such an association’
(Suits 1978, 144). We believe that the inscrutable excess that separates the game from
playing a game allows Suits to think of the existence of a more complex practice that
makes compatible the autotelic experience of the game and the non-autotelic one. In
this regard, according to Morgan (2015) it is possible to understand Suits (1978, 145)
when he states that playing a game is not exclusive to amateurs. A player accepts the
rules of the game ‘just because such acceptance makes possible such activity’, but that
does not mean that it is ‘the only reason he may have’ (Suits 1978, 144). In this sense, the
professional player can play a game in spite of being paid for that. As Huang and Ryall
(2018, 84) point out: ‘The fact that one is paid can be considered alongside other
auxiliary goals or motivations for engaging in games, such as being sociable, getting
fit, or raising money for charity’.
In synthesis, Suits’ theory of games offers the possibility of developing a philosophy
oriented toward the game as an object. In fact, by introducing open-ended ludic
practices in his definition of the game, he also introduces an insurmountable distance
between the game itself and the game played. This distance is presented in two ways.
On the one hand, the game is shown to be excessive with regard to the interpretation of
its elements according to a challenge. On the other hand, the game exceeds the
transformation of its elements in order to modify the challenge without jeopardising
its identity. In our opinion, by contemplating these two ways of presenting the excess
between the game itself and the game played in terms of the tensions and ruptures
proposed by OOP, we are able to develop the basis for a philosophy of PE oriented
toward the game as an object.
Basis for a Philosophy of PE Oriented Toward the Game as an Object:
Exploration of its Inscrutable Reality
Based on OOP, we have shown the degree to which Suits’ theory supports the idea that
the inscrutable reality of a game turns the ludic practice into a space capable of
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surprising and intrinsically motivating curiosity in players. They experience this space by
exploring the different possibilities to interpret and transform its parts to overcome
a challenge and to generate new ones. We recall that for Harman’s OOP, the exploration
of what is hidden in an object was based on four types of tensions (time, eidos, space,
and essence) and four types of ruptures (confrontation, theory, allure and causation). We
will see to what extent we can apply these considerations to the game philosophy
elaborated by Suits.
For Suits, one of the ways to explore the inscrutable reality of a game is by ‘playing
a game’. To do so, it is necessary to adopt a lusory attitude. As we have argued above,
this attitude is compatible with other attitudes, but it is only necessary to play the game.
The lusory attitude offers the game a presence as ludic practice: an intentional or sensual
object that unifies the possible relationships among its elements (lusory means) based
on some constitutive rules and with an intrinsic purpose (prelusory goal). This object
would establish a space where the actions performed to overcome the challenge would
be established. This relational space would remain hidden to the player, and it would
only have presence as a break with the established challenge. When the difficulty of the
challenge is not sufficiently motivating, the ludic practice become an object of explicit
attention.
In addition, the different actions performed in a relational space would represent the
accidental traits of the game, just as the player experiences them. The tension between the
unit of the game experienced and the progression of the actions performed would receive,
according to the terminology developed by Harman, the name of time. The time within the
game would indicate the tension between stability and change, that is, the variability of the
actions within the integrity of a relational space determined by a challenge.
During the game, players synthesize the variability of their actions in facing a challenge,
establishing different regularities. They are theoretical abstractions that offer different
performance models or strategies that guide the player. Unlike the possible actions to
resolve a challenge, the performance models would point to the real features or qualities of
the ludic practice. However, like the accidental features, the real features do not use up the
intentional object. It is always possible to find new strategies that orient us in the game. The
tension between the multiple performance models and the unit of the game experienced
as ludic practice would receive the name of eidos.
However, when playing, it is possible to direct actions according to strategies that are
not generated through intuition, but rather through deduction or speculation. This
situation would produce a fourth tension with the game in so far as it is considered
an object withdrawn from its accidental features. This tension is called essence. The
essential features grant identity to the game apart from the experience.
These four tensions represent the way a player explores the constancy and variability
within a ludic practice. However, they do not show how radical transformations are produced
in it. Thus, it is necessary to explore how these tensions are broken. Confrontationwouldmean
a rupture with the time of a game, for example, as a consequence of a confusion when
interpreting a challenge and trying to resolve it through a series of actions. This operation
would break the continuity of the actions performed to face the challenge. Contrastingwould
appear as a rupture with the eidos of a game. This would occur when the player theoretically
rethinks the strategy that had been used until that moment to orient his/her ludic practice.
The operation of fusion would occur as allure with regard to the space and as causation with
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regard to the essence. The allure would be produced, as mentioned above, when relational
space generated by the lusory attitude is questioned when accepting a challenge. The lack of
difficulty of a challenge obligates the player to create a new space by transforming some of
the elements of the game and, thus, exploring what remains hidden to the practice itself, the
real game, which exists apart from experience and is the source of new possibilities. Finally,
causation occurs as a break with the essential features of a game. This operation is closely
linked to allure because it is necessary to look at the real game to find new strategies that
guide its actions.
Application of the Theory of Games to a Typical PE Game
In order to exemplify this proposal, we will explain it using the typical PE game ‘5 catch’. The
PE teacher could adopt an attitude oriented toward the game as a socialization and qualifica-
tion instrument, and thus justify its presence in his/her classes due to its extrinsic values: the
game teaches teamwork, the students develop their physical condition and their coordina-
tion, etc. However, the teacher could also adopt an attitude oriented toward the game as an
object, and try to make his/her students find it valuable to explore its inscrutable reality. The
game of ‘5 catch’, disconnected from any external relationship, has an autonomous and
mysterious reality. To this end, the teacher must favour the encounter with its capacity to
provoke wonder by showing that there are infinite possibilities to solve a challenge and to
transform its elements by generating new challenges. As we have seen, one way to do this is
through the ludic practice. Among all the possibilities for playing this game, the teacherwould
choose one. A relational space to carry out possible actions according to a challenge (an
intrinsic goal with a certain difficulty): manage to execute 5 passes in a row among the
members of a same team; a set of rules: two teams of six players each, a space measuring
20x20m and a basketball. The students begin to play by exploring the infinite possibilities to
overcome a challenge through different actions. During the game, the teacher could con-
tribute to getting the students to reflect on these actions, bringing to light their strategies,
which would represent the tactics of the game. In addition, the teacher could also encourage
them to elaborate other strategies in a speculativeway: ‘And if wemove in a straight line?’ This
act of speculation about the playing tactics would involve a reflection about the essence of the
‘5 catch’ game. However, as the playing time evolves, the playersmight find that the proposed
challenge is not difficult enough. Its time runs out, the game gradually becomes boring. The
teacher asks the students to think about transforming the game (Suits 1978, 30). To do so, s/he
can ask the players: ‘How can we make the game more difficult?’ The student is attracted by
the part of the game that remains hidden: ‘We can reduce the space’, ‘increase the number of
steps’ etc. By transforming the challenge and the rules, the relational space of the game is
renewed. It is a question of enacting, of executing, the game again without it losing its
identity. Again, the players must try to resolve the proposed challenge. To do so, the
previously learned actions may not be useful, and they may have to create other new ones,
confronting them or contrasting them with the tactics that were useful before to orient their
practice. Finally, the teacher can suggest that the students speculate about new strategies
that would cause other ways of orienting their ludic practice.
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Conclusions
Based on Suits’ theory of games, Biesta’s theory of education and Harman’s OOP, the article
makes a first approach to a philosophy of PE oriented toward the game as an object. In it,
the theoretical bases are established for a justification of games in the school setting. In our
opinion, this philosophy provides a justification of games based on their capacity for
subjectification that complements the discourses of socialization and qualification. The
philosophy of PE oriented toward the games as an object is developed as a theory
whose intention is to use games to make students experience themselves as subjects of
a new beginning: an act of radical creativity in which they can experience their individuality
as a way of relating to the environment in a unique way. As we argued, this is not
something that teachers can plan or give to their students. However, teachers can increase
the chances for their students to experience it by carrying out an open and participatory
process to deconstruct their students’ beliefs and assumptions about games. The philoso-
phy offers the teacher different strategies to conduct this process. They could interpret and
transform the conventional objectives, rules, means and difficulties of a game to challenge
known tactics and skills, that is, the normal way in which a game is played. By showing their
students that there are different possible ways of playing a game without losing its
essence, teachers can show that the game itself is indescribable and inexhaustible. This
opens up different possibilities to consider ‘strange’ new ways of relating to it. In this way,
they leave the learning process of a game open for an act of radical creativity in which they
experience their own individuality. To achieve this, teachers can propose that students
interpret and transform the game’s objectives, means, rules and difficulties in different
ways. By offering students opportunities to give their own meaning to their ludic practices,
teachers will also give them the chance to express for themselves what makes them
unique, that is, their own subjectivity (Biesta 2010, 2013).
The experience of the ludic practice is lived intentionally as a predisposition to
openness (Hyland 1980). It becomes a space capable of astonishing, producing surprises
and novelties. Exploring this space of uncertainty is something worth considering for its
own sake, a thing of wonder (Bogost 2012, 129). Through the philosophy of PE oriented
toward the game as an object, game becomes an unconditional and autotelic activity.
The player’s commitment is not to use it as an instrument to achieve an external goal,
but rather to play it as an end in itself. The curricular justification for games as objects
contemplates the ludic practice as a valuable object in itself. In a game, the acceptance
of our possibilities and limitations would only be applicable to the activity itself
(Mclaughlin and Kretchmar 2008). From this perspective, any type of justification
would have nothing to do with the instrumentalist postures mentioned.
Disclosure statement
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